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Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance

Because banks fund illiquid loans with deposits that can be withdrawn on demand, a loss of confidence can spark a bank run where everyone withdraws at once. Deposit insurance, which in the US guarantees up to $250,000 per depositor per insured bank, removes the incentive for insured depositors to run.

Try it yourself

Bank run and deposit insurance

A solvent bank can still fail if depositors expect others to run, and deposit insurance removes the reason to run first.

The bank holds A$100 of deposits: a slice as liquid reserves, the rest lent out as illiquid loans worth full value at maturity but only a fraction if dumped early. Depositors are served in order. Move the sliders and watch the till.

Assets back A$100 of deposit claimsReserves A$12.00 (liquid)Loans A$88.00 (illiquid)
Withdrawal queue (served in order →)14 of 24 try to withdraw now
Paid in fullPart-paid (marginal)Gets nothing in the run
RUN SURVIVED. Reserves plus recoverable loans (A$60.40) cover the A$58.33 the run demands. The bank is solvent and stays liquid, so no one loses.
Solvency (held to maturity): SOLVENTLiquidity (today's run): LIQUID
Deposits (claims) DA$100.00
Reserves R (liquid)A$12.00
Loans L (illiquid)A$88.00
Run demand (now)A$58.33
Cash the bank can raiseA$60.40
Liquidity shortfallA$0.00
First mover (runs)A$4.17
Late mover (waits)A$4.17
Each of 24 depositors claims A$4.17. The bank pays from reserves first, then fire-sells loans at the recovery rate. It honours the run only when reserves + recoverable loans ≥ run demand.
Deposit insurance
In the US, insurance guarantees up to A$250,000-equivalent per depositor per insured bank. When it is on, insured depositors have no reason to run.
Reserve ratio12%
Fire-sale recovery on early loans (ρ)55%
Depositors who panic (π)60%
Try this:
Discuss. The bank in this model is always fundamentally solvent, yet it can still collapse. Why does the chance to withdraw first turn a liquidity mismatch into a self-fulfilling run, and how does a credible deposit guarantee break that belief loop without the bank ever having to sell a single loan?

Why it matters

If you fear others will withdraw first and drain the bank, your best move is to run too, which makes the fear self-fulfilling. A credible guarantee on your deposit removes the reason to run.

Before you read on — recall

Deposit insurance prevents bank runs mainly by

Worked examples

Scenario

A solvent bank faces a sudden rumor about its health. Why can it still fail, and what stops the panic?

Solution

It cannot sell illiquid loans fast enough to pay every depositor at once, so a pure liquidity run can sink even a healthy bank. Deposit insurance stops the panic by guaranteeing insured deposits regardless of the rumor.

Scenario

Silicon Valley Bank, March 2023. On 8 March 2023 the bank disclosed it had sold about US$21 billion of available-for-sale securities, mostly long-dated Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, at a realized after-tax loss of about US$1.8 billion because their market value had fallen after the sharp 2022-23 interest-rate rises. Why did this trigger a run, and what is the lesson?

Solution

The disclosure revealed a large unhedged interest-rate (duration) loss on long-dated bonds funded by a highly concentrated base of uninsured deposits, who had every incentive to flee first. A run of about US$42 billion in withdrawals hit on 9 March, and the FDIC placed the bank in receivership on 10 March 2023, the second-largest US bank failure at the time. The lesson is that a bank that looks solvent on a hold-to-maturity basis can still fail on a liquidity run once uninsured depositors rush the exit.

Common mistakes

  • Only insolvent banks suffer runs. Even a solvent bank can be brought down by a self-fulfilling liquidity run.
  • Deposit insurance is a free fix. It creates moral hazard, the hidden cost of the safety net.

Revision bullets

  • Banks are liquid for depositors but hold illiquid loans
  • Runs can be self-fulfilling, even at a solvent bank
  • Deposit insurance removes the incentive to run

Quick check

Deposit insurance prevents bank runs mainly by

Connected topics

More in Banking & Financial Regulation

Sources

  1. Mishkin (2018), Ch. 10
    Mishkin, F. S. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. 12th ed. Pearson, 2018. ISBN 978-1-292-26885-9.
    Bank runs, the government safety net, and deposit insurance.
How to cite this page
Dr. Phil's Quant Lab. (2026). Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance. Derivatives Atlas. https://phucnguyenvan.com/concept/mb-bank-runs
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